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INTRODUCTION
his article is based on the view that the global regulatory
framework of humanitarian relief that is emerging, under
the auspices of both state and non-state actors, is premised on
a human rights-based approach to humanitarian assistance,
which may crystallize a duty to ensure local participation. It is
in that context that the article proceeds to examine the prob-
lems and opportunities associated with the obligation to ensure
local participation.
The term “humanitarian” is often associated with humane
and positive actions in relation to humanity.1 Humanitarian
assistance or relief is meant to alleviate the suffering of popu-
lations affected by a humanitarian crisis by protecting life and
safeguarding the human dignity of affected peoples.2 An exam-
ination of international legal instruments such as treaties, res-
olutions adopted under the auspices of the United Nations
(“U.N.”), and the practice of states, confirms the existence of a
right to provide humanitarian assistance. Therefore, as this
section will demonstrate, the right to provide humanitarian
assistance exists in international law.
Since treaties are among the primary sources of international
law, this article begins by examining the relevant provisions of
such international legal instruments. Article 214(1) of the
1. B.S. Chimni, Globalization, Humanitarianism and the Erosion of Ref-
ugee Protection, 13 J. REFUGEE STUD. 243, 244 (2000).
2. AUSTRIAN DEV. COOPERATION, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AID:
POLICYDOCUMENT 8 (2009),
http://www.entwicklung.at/uploads/media/PD_International_humanitarian_a
id_03.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2015).
T
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Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides that
the humanitarian aid operations of the European Union (“EU”)
“shall be intended to provide ad hoc assistance and relief and
protection for people in third countries who are victims of natu-
ral or man-made disasters, in order to meet the humanitarian
needs resulting from these different situations.”3 Additionally,
the Food Assistance Convention, ratified by Canada, Switzer-
land, Denmark, the United States, Austria, Finland, EU and
Japan in 2012, specifically regulates the provision of food aid to
vulnerable populations,4 aiming to ensure that the most vul-
nerable populations are granted appropriate relief food in a
timely and effective manner.5 Other treaties impose specific
obligations to provide humanitarian assistance. The Protocol
Relating to Conflict Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security of
the Economic Community of West African States (“ECOWAS”)
provides that the sub-regional organization may participate in
the provision of humanitarian assistance.6 Specifically, the Pro-
tocol recognizes that ECOWAS has a responsibility to “inter-
vene to alleviate the suffering of the populations and restore
life to normalcy in the event of crises, conflict and disaster.”7
The right to provide humanitarian assistance has also been
affirmed by “soft law” instruments such as resolutions adopted
under the auspices of the U.N. and its institutions. In 1991, the
U.N. General Assembly adopted the Resolution on Strengthen-
ing of the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assis-
tance, one of several instruments designed to facilitate effective
delivery of relief within states.8 This resolution affirmed the
3. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 214.1, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
4. Food Assistance Convention art. 1, Apr. 25, 2012, 52 I.L.M. 357.
5. Id. art. 2.
6. ECOWAS COMM’N, PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE MECHANISM FOR
CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT, RESOLUTION, PEACE-KEEPING AND
SECURITY art. 40 (1999) [hereinafter CONFLICT PREVENTION PROTOCOL],
http://documentation.ecowas.int/download/en/legal_documents/protocols/Prot
ocol%20Relating%20to%20the%20Mechanism%20for%20Conflict%20Preventi
on,%20Management,%20Resolution,%20Peacekeeping%20and%20Security.p
df (last visited Sept. 10, 2015). ECOWAS is comprised of fifteen West African
states. Basic Information, ECON. COMMUNITY WEST AFRICAN STATES,
http://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/basic-information/ (last visited April 26,
2015).
7. CONFLICT PREVENTION PROTOCOL, supra note 6, art. 40.
8. G.A. Res. 46/182 (Dec. 19, 1991).
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central role of the U.N. in providing coordination and leader-
ship services in the supply of emergency aid.9 The U.N. also
maintains specialized institutions for promoting effective pro-
vision of humanitarian assistance, such as the United Nations
Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (“UNISDR”).10 Established
in December 1999, the UNISDR facilitates the effective imple-
mentation of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduc-
tion.11 In particular, the 2005 Hyogo Declaration, adopted un-
der the auspices of the UNISDR, recognized the necessity of
strengthening the capacity of the local community to reduce the
risks of various forms of disasters and the vulnerability of the
people.12
The obstruction of humanitarian assistance by state and non-
state actors, and the need to create an environment conducive
for relief provision, have led the U.N. Security Council to au-
thorize forceful intervention within a state in accordance with
its powers under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. In 1992, the
U.N. Security Council authorized member nations to establish
“a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in
Somalia” through “all necessary means,” which permitted
forceful intervention.13 Member states were requested to pro-
vide military forces to implement the Security Council deci-
sion.14 As a result, on December 9, 1992, the Unified Task
Force (“UNITAF”) was formed under the leadership of the
United States, but with military contingents from other states,
and was deployed in Mogadishu, Somalia, for purposes of in-
tervention.15
Yet the provision of humanitarian assistance, where it does
not involve forceful military intervention, does not require pri-
or authorization by the U.N. Security Council in order for it to
9. Id.
10. UNISDR in the UN System, UNISDR, http://www.unisdr.org/who-we-
are/unisdr-in-un (last visited April 26, 2015).
11. Who We Are, UNISDR, http://www.unisdr.org/who-we-are (last visited
April 26, 2015).
12. World Conference on Disaster Reduction, Report of the World Confer-
ence on Disaster Reduction, Hyogo Declaration, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.206/6
(Jan. 22, 2005) [hereinafter Hyogo Declaration].
13. S.C. Res. 794 (Dec. 3, 1992).
14. Id.para. 11.
15. Somalia – UNOSOM I: Background, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom1backgr2.html (last
visited June17, 2015).
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be legally acceptable. For example, in the Military and Para-
military Activities in and Against Nicaragua (“Nicaragua v
United States”), the International Court of Justice held that
“the provision of strictly humanitarian aid to persons or forces
in another country, whatever their political affiliations or ob-
jectives, cannot be regarded as unlawful intervention, or as in
any other way contrary to international law.”16 Therefore, prior
authorization by the Security Council is only necessary where
the provision of humanitarian assistance is undertaken in the
context of a forceful military intervention.
There are also principles which have, over time, evolved with-
in the international legal system to regulate the provision of
humanitarian assistance. The principles of impartiality, neu-
trality, and nondiscrimination in providing humanitarian as-
sistance are well developed and widely accepted.17 The general
acceptance and evolution of these principles supports the exist-
ence of a right for states to provide humanitarian assistance, as
they stipulate the governing principles under which relief
should be provided. The EU’s legal framework accepts these
principles, as Article 214(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union provides that “[h]umanitarian aid opera-
tions shall be conducted in compliance with the principles of
international law and with the principles of impartiality, neu-
trality and non-discrimination.”18
The right to provide humanitarian assistance is also implied
by the right to development, which confers an obligation to
provide humanitarian assistance where necessary.19 For in-
16. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), Advisory Opinion, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 242 (June 27).
17. See, e.g., TFEU art. 214.2, supra note 3. As Craig Allan and Thérèse
O’Donnell observe, “the cardinal principles of impartiality, neutrality, hu-
manitarian purpose and non-discrimination are regularly stressed in the
patchwork of instruments which comprise the hard and soft architecture of
international disaster response law.” Craig Allan & Thérèse O’Donnell, An
Offer You Cannot Refuse? Natural Disasters, the Politics of Aid Refusal and
Potential Legal Implications, 5(1) AMSTER. L. FORUM 36, 39 (2013).
18. TFEU, supra note 3, art. 214.2.
19. There is some interdependence between the right to development and
the right to provide humanitarian assistance, although they are also distinct
legal claims. Article I of the 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development
defines the right as “an inalienable human right by virtue of which every
human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and
enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in [an environment
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stance, the 1991 General Assembly Resolution on Strengthen-
ing of the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assis-
tance of the United Nations states that development and emer-
gency assistance are interrelated.20 It notes that to promote ef-
fective “transition from relief to rehabilitation and develop-
ment, emergency assistance should be provided in ways that
will be supportive of recovery and long-term development.”21
Therefore, emergency-humanitarian assistance should facili-
tate long-term development.22
Other U.N. instruments demonstrate the interrelation of the
right to development and the right to provide humanitarian
assistance. The 1986 United Nations General Assembly
(“UNGA”) Declaration on the Right to Development states that
the “right to development is an inalienable human right” and is
a basis for which “all human rights and fundamental freedoms
can be fully realized.”23 The 1993 UNGA Vienna Declaration
and Programme of Action affirms “the need for humanitarian
assistance to victims of all natural and man-made disasters”
and stresses that the right to development is “universal and
inalienable” and “must be implemented and realized.”24 Alt-
hough there has been disagreement on whether the right to de-
velopment amounts to a proper human right, the consensus
achieved during the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme
of Action, which has been reaffirmed in subsequent inter-
governmental forums, essentially resolved the issue.25
in] which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be realized.” Dec-
laration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986) [here-
inafter Right to Development].
20. G.A. Res. 46/182, supra note 8, ¶ 10.
21. Id. ¶ 9.
22. Id.
23. Right to Development, supra note 19, art. 1.
24. World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Pro-
gramme of Action, at 23, 72, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993) [here-
inafter Vienna Declaration].
25. Arjun Sengupta, On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Develop-
ment, in REFLECTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT 61, 64 (Arjun Sengupta
et al. eds., 2005). For instance, the UNGA reaffirmed the right to develop-
ment and “its commitment to the Vienna Declaration,” establishing the posi-
tion of the High Commissioner for Human Rights with the responsibility of
promoting “the universal respect for and observance of all human rights.”
G.A. Res. 48/141 (Dec. 20, 1993).
2015] Global Regulation of Humanitarian Relief 797
Less formal international instruments also support the exist-
ence of a right to provide humanitarian assistance. The 2008
European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid defines the princi-
ples, policy and values of the EU relief activities.26 The princi-
ples espoused by the European Consensus are a clear indica-
tion that the European Commission approves of a right to pro-
vide humanitarian assistance. Similarly, the Good Humanitar-
ian Donorship (“GHD”) is an informal forum of states from
across the globe that are humanitarian assistance donors, with
the objective of encouraging and stimulating “principled donor
behavior and, by extension, improved humanitarian action.”27
The GHD objective is a further indication of the approval of a
right to provide humanitarian assistance.
The above analysis of various international instruments indi-
cates the existence of a right to provide humanitarian assis-
tance. However, there is the problem of its justiciability and
enforcement. Indeed, there are arguments that an alleged
claim or entitlement, like the right to provide humanitarian
assistance, must be properly justiciable or enforceable in order
to qualify as a legal right. For instance, a humanitarian agency
may have little leverage in ensuring that a sanction is enforced
on a state that rejects and obstructs the delivery of humanitar-
ian assistance, despite the suffering of its population. Arjun
Sengupta points out that some positivist lawyers have postu-
lated the view that “rights” which cannot be legally enforced
should be viewed “as social aspirations or statements of objec-
tives” as they do not qualify to be regarded as human rights.28
However, as Sengupta argues, such views are inaccurate as
26. European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/media/publications/consensus_en.pdf (last visit-
ed May 21, 2014).
27. About GHD, GHD INITIATIVE,
http://www.ghdinitiative.org/ghd/gns/about-us/about-ghd.html (last visited
May 18, 2015). As of May 2014, GHD members included Australia, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, Ireland, Nether-
lands, Poland, Romania, Spain, United Kingdom, Austria, Brazil, Czech Re-
public, Estonia, France, Hungary, Italy, Liechtenstein, Malta, New Zealand,
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Sweden, the United States of America, Belgium,
Canada, Cyprus, European Commission, Germany, Iceland, Japan, Lithua-
nia, Mexico, Norway, Republic of Korea, Slovenia, and Switzerland. See Our
Members, GHDINITIATIVE.ORG, http://www.ghdinitiative.org/ghd/gns/about-
us/11.html (last visited May 18, 2015).
28. Sengupta, supra note 25, at 76–77.
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they reduce human rights to strict legal rights only.29 While
there may be limitations in the justiciability or enforcement of
a right due to lack of proper legal sanctions in situations where
the right is violated, it does not imply that the right is nonex-
istent.30 Furthermore, it should be noted that various rights
and duties established under international law have challenges
and problems of enforcement.31
Human rights may exist even in the absence of explicit legis-
lation. As Amartya Sen contends, “[h]uman rights may well be
reflected in legislation, and may also inspire legislation, but
this is a further fact, rather than a defining characteristic of
human rights themselves.”32 Indeed, human rights may pre-
cede legislation, since such rights are derived from the notion
of human dignity rather than from a strictly legal source.33 It is
on this basis that Sengupta rightly argues that “[t]here is noth-
ing in principle to prevent a right being an internationally rec-
ognized human right even if it is not individually justiciable.”34
Therefore, problems of enforcement, or lack of well-defined le-
gal sanctions in case of a breach of an alleged right, do not nec-
essarily imply that the right is nonexistent.
However, the right to provide humanitarian assistance does
not suffer from lack of enforcement in all circumstances. There
are methods that humanitarian agencies can exploit in order to
provide relief, which at times can be effective sanctions against
an unwilling state, and can be the basis upon which the right
to provide humanitarian assistance is recognized. First, hu-
29. Id. at 77.
30. In addition, despite the lack of proper legal remedies and sanctions for
failure to enforce some rights, unjustifiable or manifestly unreasonable fail-
ure may have undesirable political, moral, and ethical repercussions.
31. For instance, there is a problem with the full realization of the right to
health. Andra Roux-Kemp points out that “formal obligations of governments
with regard to human rights [such as the right to health] do not necessarily
ensure that right-holders enjoy the full protection and realisation of these
rights in practice” because governments may be confronted by economic and
resource constraints, among other factors. Andra le Roux-Kemp, Realising
the Right to Health in Nigeria: Incongruities between International Obliga-
tions and Domestic Implementation, 2 AFR. NAZARENEU.L.J. 119, 121 (2014).
32. Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Development, in DEVELOPMENT AS A
HUMAN RIGHT: LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS 1, 3 (Bard A.
Andreassen et al. eds., 2006).
33. Sengupta, supra note 25, at 77.
34. Id.
2015] Global Regulation of Humanitarian Relief 799
manitarian agencies can lobby other states and intergovern-
mental organizations, such as the U.N., to condemn the con-
cerned state, and apply diplomatic pressure for the concerned
state to accept the distribution of humanitarian relief to its
population. States and intergovernmental organizations can
even be lobbied to apply economic and other forms of sanctions
to the concerned state, especially where the actions have no
implication on the already suffering population. Second, hu-
manitarian agencies can lobby the U.N., through the Security
Council, to authorize forceful intervention to create an envi-
ronment that is conducive for the provision of humanitarian
assistance and saving lives. The Security Council has the com-
petence to rely on its powers under Articles 24, 25, and Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter to authorize a forceful intervention if it
establishes that the humanitarian crisis within a state is a
threat to international peace and security.35
In light of these considerations, it is apparent that the right
to provide humanitarian assistance exists in the international
legal regime. As discussed, various international legal instru-
ments, including treaties, support the existence of a right to
provide humanitarian assistance, and that right exists irre-
spective of some of its enforceability challenges. Furthermore,
this right forms the basis for the responsibilities of state au-
thorities, humanitarian agencies, and even those of the parties
in a conflict situation.36 However, despite the existence of the
right to provide humanitarian assistance, it is highly doubtful
that the right to receive assistance also exists in the interna-
tional legal regime.37
35. For instance, in 1992 the Security Council relied on Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter powers in Resolution 794 when it authorized states “to use all
necessary means to establish . . . a secure environment for humanitarian re-
lief operations in Somalia.” S.C. Res. 794, supra note 13.
36. Charlotte Dufour et. al., Rights, Standards and Quality in a Complex
Humanitarian Space: Is Sphere the Right Tool?, 28 DISASTERS 124, 130
(2004).
37. Id. This is due to the fact that, in theory and practice, it is difficult to
establish that a community or individuals have a clear legal entitlement to
receive humanitarian assistance from foreign states and non-state actors.
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I. SELF-REGULATION BYNON-STATE ACTORS: CONTRIBUTIONS
TO THE LEGAL AND POLICY REGIME ONHUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE
“Non-state actors” include the various participants in inter-
national and national activities that are not states, and they
constitute an important part of international humanitarian as-
sistance system. Non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) are
among the most active non-state actors in humanitarian relief
activities. On that basis, this article will now examine the role
of NGOs and related civil-society organizations. As Henry Stei-
ner et al observe, NGOs are “an indispensable component in
the functioning of the international human rights regime.”38
The significant role of NGOs in the making of international
law, especially in the drafting of international legal instru-
ments, has been acknowledged by commentators.39 For in-
stance, Christine Chinkin points out that NGOs are often di-
rectly involved in the drafting of treaties, contributing profes-
sional expertise and commitment where the expertise of gov-
ernment representatives is insufficient.40 Specific forms of par-
ticipation by NGOs include negotiations, providing infor-
mation, lobbying governments, and preparing drafts of the
treaty text.41 Furthermore, the role of NGOs proceeds beyond
the drafting of treaties, as they subsequently insist on and
monitor implementation and accountability by states, while
“naming and shaming” violators.42 These actions stimulate sig-
nificantly the institutionalization of international-legal
38. HENRY J. STEINER ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT
1420–21 (2007).
39. Eric Suy, New Players in International Relations, in STATE,
SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 373, 376 (Gerard Kreijen ed.,
2002).
40. Christine Chinkin, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in
Standard Setting, Monitoring and Implementation of Human Rights, in THE
CHANGING WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A
TRIBUTE TO THE LATE KENNETH R. SIMMONDS 45, 52 (Joseph J. Norton et. al.
eds., 1998). States and intergovernmental organizations have been keen to
promote and endorse the activities of NGOs as they have benefitted from the
services and advocacy of such organizations in resolving global problems.
Kim D. Reimann, A View from the Top: International Politics, Norms and the
Worldwide Growth of NGOs, 50 INT’L STUD. Q. 45, 63–64 (2006).
41. Chinkin, supra note 40, at 52.
42. ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THEMAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
81 (2007).
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norms.43 Indeed, NGOs have been described as “societal actors
that persuade, pressure and teach states new ideas, values,
and practices.”44
NGOs are increasingly providing important expertise in the
negotiation and drafting of international instruments, and at
times even participate in states’ delegations. Indeed, Henry
Steiner et al. observe that there has been a “blurring of the dis-
tinction between the insiders and the outsiders as NGO repre-
sentatives have become part of governmental delegations.”45
Steiner et al. further note that “NGOs have also increasingly
become key partners in the delivery of humanitarian and other
forms of development assistance.”46 For instance, Costa Rica’s
commitment to healthcare has not evolved solely from decisions
at the state level, but has also involved health agendas formu-
lated by international donors, as is the case with other develop-
ing countries.47 Similarly, the 1993 Vienna Declaration recom-
mended that nongovernmental and related organizations
should undertake greater roles in promoting the right to devel-
opment, which has a nexus to the right to provide humanitari-
an assistance.48
NGOs have developed self-regulation standards and bench-
marks in order to promote efficiency, quality, and accountabil-
ity in the provision of humanitarian relief. For instance, the
Sphere Project was established in 1997 as an initiative of vari-
ous NGOs and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
43. Id. The diverse roles that NGOs perform in relation to human rights
and humanitarian issues include funding projects, highlighting and criticiz-
ing violations of obligations, and lobbying governments for global policy de-
velopments. Daniel Bell & Joseph H. Carens, The Ethical Dilemmas of Inter-
national Human Rights and Humanitarian NGOs: Reflections on a Dialogue
Between Practitioners and Theorists, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 300, 301–02, 312–13
(2004).
44. Reimann, supra note 40, at 59.
45. STEINER ET AL., supra note 38, at 1421.
46. Id.
47. LYNN M. MORGAN, COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN HEALTH: THE POLITICS
OF PRIMARY CARE IN COSTARICA 10 (1993).
48. Vienna Declaration, supra note 24, paras. 73–74. In addition to affirm-
ing the role of nongovernmental organizations in the realization of the right
to development, the 1993 Vienna Declaration is significant because it empha-
sized “the need for humanitarian assistance to victims of all natural and
man-made disasters.” Id. para. 23. On the interdependence between the
right to development and the right to provide humanitarian assistance, see
the introductory section of this article.
802 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:3
movement.49 The Sphere Project drafted the Sphere Humani-
tarian Charter, one of the most well-known international non-
state self-regulation mechanism.50 The Sphere Humanitarian
Charter stipulates minimum core standards in humanitarian
relief for food security, nutrition, and health, amongst other
life-saving activities.51 Likewise, People in Aid, a consortium of
humanitarian NGOs, aims to promote organizational effective-
ness in the provision of humanitarian assistance.52 People in
Aid provides membership and quality certification to humani-
tarian agencies involved in humanitarian activities.53 As of
June 2015, there were 202 member agencies of the People in
Aid network.54
Another NGO with influence in the development of the self-
regulation mechanisms is the Humanitarian Accountability
49. SPHERE PROJECT, HUMANITARIAN CHARTER AND MINIMUM STANDARDS IN
HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE 4 (2011), http://www.sphereproject.org/silo/files/the-
sphere-handbook.zip (last visited Sept. 10, 2015). The Board of the Sphere
Project is comprised of eighteen organizations. Members include the Interna-
tional Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Sphere India,
CARE International, Aktion Deutschland Hilft, International Medical Corps,
Office Africain pour le Développement et la Coopération, ACT Alli-
ance/Norwegian Church Aid, Caritas Internationalis, InterAction, Interna-
tional Council of Voluntary Agencies, Plan International, World Vision Inter-
national, Lutheran World Federation/DanChurchAid, RedR International,
Save the Children, Salvation Army, Oxfam International and Policy Action
Group on Emergency Response. Board Organizations, SPHERE PROJECT,
http://www.sphereproject.org/sphere/en/about/governance/board-member-
organizations (last visited Oct. 22, 2013).
50. For a more detailed discussion of the contributions of the self-
regulation standards and benchmarks articulated in the Sphere Charter, in
the evolution of a progressive and more “victim centered” legal regime gov-
erning humanitarian assistance, especially in health and nutrition relief ac-
tivities, see Shahla Ali & Tom Kabau, Non-State Actors and the Evolution of
Humanitarian Norms: Implications of the Sphere Charter in Health and Nu-
trition Relief 5 J. INT’L. HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 70, 70–104 (2014).
51. SPHERE PROJECT, supra note 49, at 4.
52. About People in Aid, PEOPLE IN AID,
http://www.peopleinaid.org/about/default.aspx (last visited May 22, 2014).
53. Membership, PEOPLE IN AID,
http://www.peopleinaid.org/about/default.aspx (last visited May 22, 2014).
54. Members’ Directory, PEOPLE IN AID,
http://www.peopleinaid.org/membership/directory.aspx (last visited Apr. 25,
2014)
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Project (“HAP”).55 HAP is comprised of a group of humanitarian
organizations that have the objective of enhancing accountabil-
ity to the recipients of relief through quality mechanisms such
as certification.56 In addition, HAP provides a forum through
which relief recipients can articulate grievances against hu-
manitarian organizations.57 Another important institution for
self-regulation by the NGOs is the Emergency Capacity Build-
ing (“ECB”) Project. The ECB Project was established in 2004
when relief agencies, including Mercy Corps, Oxfam Great
Britain, CARE International, Save the Children, Catholic Re-
lief Services, International Rescue Committee, and World Vi-
sion International, met to discuss effective provisions of hu-
manitarian assistance.58 The ECB Project is tasked with im-
proving the quality, speed, and effectiveness through which
humanitarian relief is administered.59
In some cases, self-regulation standards embraced by NGOs
have been adopted by the UNGA. When self-regulation stand-
ards are embraced by the UNGA, they acquire the status of
what is referred to as “soft law.”60 Upon adoption by the UNGA,
such regulations inform the analysis of state practice, which is
a prerequisite in the formation of new rules of customary in-
ternational law.61 One example of the UNGA’s adoption of
NGOs self-regulation standards was its acceptance of the
55. The History of HAP, HUMANITARIAN ACCOUNTABILITY PARTNERSHIP,
http://www.hapinternational.org/who-we-are/about-us/the-history-of-hap.aspx
(last visited Apr. 25, 2014).
56. About Us, HUMANITARIAN ACCOUNTABILITY PARTNERSHIP,
http://www.hapinternational.org/who-we-are/about-us.aspx (last visited Apr.
25, 2014).
57. Jacqui Tong, Questionable Accountability: MSF and Sphere in 2003, 28
DISASTERS 176, 176 (2004).
58. The Project, EMERGENCY CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT,
http://www.ecbproject.org/about.aspx (last visited Apr. 25, 2014).
59. Id.
60. The phrase “soft law” is used in reference to various international legal
instruments, which, though not explicitly legally binding, still have some
legal value, and therefore regulate the conduct of states and international
organizations to an extent. Alan Boyle, Soft Law in International Law Mak-
ing, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 122, 122 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 3d ed. 2012).
61. The International Court of Justice has already clarified that the ele-
ments necessary to form a new customary international law are state practice
and opinio juris. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua, supra note 16, ¶ 207; see also North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G.
v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 77 (Feb. 20).
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Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of In-
ternational Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance,
which had been negotiated under the International Federation
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (“IFRC”), in General
Assembly Resolutions 63/137, 63/139 and 63/141 of 2008.62
As globalization increases, NGOs will have an even greater
impact on the development of international legal and policy
norms. Globalization refers to the increasing interdependence,
interaction, and interconnectedness of states and societies in
various spheres, including on matters related to ethics, human
rights, and law.63 The process of globalization has increased the
role of non-state actors in humanitarian assistance.64 Globali-
zation has been exemplified by phenomenal growth in nongov-
ernmental transnational activities, partly due to the opportuni-
ties provided by modern transport and communication sys-
tems.65 Indeed, Joseph Nye and David Welch specifically ob-
serve that “the dramatic expansion of transnational channels
and contacts means that more policies are up for grabs interna-
tionally, including regulations and practices…that were for-
merly regarded as the prerogatives of national governments.”66
Traditionally, states were the only significant actors in inter-
national matters, especially in the making of international le-
gal and policy norms. However, as Véronique Lapaige observes,
62. IDRL Guidelines, INT’L FED’N RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOC’Y,
http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/idrl/idrl-guidelines/ (last visited May 10,
2013).
63. Bard A. Andreassen, Development and the Human Rights Responsibili-
ties of Non-State Actors, in DEVELOPMENT AS A HUMAN RIGHT: LEGAL,
POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS 123 (Bard A. Andreassen et al. eds.,
2006). On the meaning and implication of globalization, see Peter Viggo Jak-
obsen, The Transformation of United Nations Peace Operations in the 1990s:
Adding Globalization to the Conventional `End of the Cold War Explanation’,
37 COOPERATION& CONFLICT 267, 268 (2002); Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S.
Nye, Jr., Globalization: What’s New? What’s Not? (And So What?), 118
FOREIGN POL’Y 104, 105 (2000).
64. Andreassen, supra note 63, at 123. According to Chimni, some of the
emerging principles in relation to humanitarian assistance, under the con-
cept of “new humanitarianism,” are as a result of the implications of globali-
zation. Chimni, supra note 1, at 245.
65. ANN KELLEHER & LAURA KLEIN, GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES: A HANDBOOK
FORUNDERSTANDINGGLOBAL ISSUES 17 (3d ed. 2009).
66. JOSEPH S. NYE, JR. & DAVID A. WELCH, UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL
CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY AND HISTORY
243 (8th ed. 2011).
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the “nation-state system is no longer the only foundation of
global governance,” as there are now other important partici-
pants.67 Wolf Heydebrand echoes this conclusion, asserting that
the reality of global governance without government has
emerged due to the declining classical concepts of state sover-
eignty and the influence of international law.68 The role and
influence of important self-regulating mechanisms of NGOs
and civil society organizations, such as the Sphere Humanitar-
ian Charter, HAP, People in Aid and ECB Project exemplify
what Heydebrand refers to as “governance without govern-
ment.”69 Therefore, NGOs are a significant component of the
non-state actors that are contributing to the global governance
of humanitarian relief through a human rights-based ap-
proach, a concept that is discussed in Part III of this article.
One of globalization’s merits, especially in relation to human-
itarian relief, is that it has converted previously local problems,
including problems in health, food, and investment, into trans-
national concerns.70 However, Véronique Lapaige is cautious
that the weakening influence of the state due to globalization,
“despite its merits on access to global aid, may have an implica-
tion on local participation.”71 Globalization may be deemed as
an antithesis of localization, and may be seen as likely to un-
dermine the role and legitimacy of local participants in the
provision of humanitarian assistance. However, this article
postulates the view that the global governance of humanitarian
assistance has adopted a human rights approach, which is evi-
dent in the self-regulatory mechanisms of NGOs. This has been
the basis of the emerging obligation to ensure quality local par-
ticipation. The human rights-based approach, and the emerg-
67. Véronique Lapaige, “Globalized Public Health:” A Transdisciplinary
Comprehensive Framework for Analyzing Contemporary Globalization’s In-
fluences on the Field of Public Health, 2 RISKMGMT. & HEALTHCARE POL’Y 73,
74 (2009).
68. Wolf Heydebrand, From Globalisation of Law to Law under Globalisa-
tion, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 117, 120 (David Nelken & Johannes Feest
eds., 2001).
69. Id.
70. Lapaige, supra note 67, at 74. On globalization blurring the distinction
between domestic and foreign issues and problems, see Rebecca Katz et al.,
Defining Health Diplomacy: Changing Demands in the Era of Globalization,
89 MILBANKQ. 503, 504 (2011).
71. Lapaige, supra note 67, at 74.
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ing obligation to ensure local participation, is examined in
more detail in Part III of this article.
II. DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE REALIZATION OF
THE RIGHT TO PROVIDEHUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
This section focuses on the nature of rights and duties that
accrue to state and non-state actors in relation to the provision
of humanitarian assistance. Wesley Hohfeld popularized the
concept that rights and duties are correlative concepts.72 He
observed that, “it is certain that even those who use the word
and the conception ‘right’ in the broadest possible way are ac-
customed to thinking of ‘duty’ as the invariable correlative.”73 It
is generally accepted that “[t]o ascribe a right to one person is
to imply that some other person is under a corresponding du-
ty.”74
Therefore, where the international community and agencies
claim a right to provide humanitarian assistance, the questions
of the nature of correlative duties, and entities that bear them,
arise. Duties are often phrased as responsibilities. This article
argues that a state’s right to provide humanitarian assistance
implies an obligation on the state to consent to, and not to ob-
struct, the delivery of humanitarian relief, if it is unable or
unwilling to provide it. The state has a primary responsibility
to provide humanitarian assistance,75 and is therefore under a
duty to accept such assistance where it is unable or unwilling
to do so. Indeed, international instruments have specifically
pointed out this state responsibility, including the 1991 Decla-
ration on the Strengthening of the Co-ordination of Humanitar-
ian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations, which states:
Each State has the responsibility first and foremost to take
care of the victims of natural disasters and other emergencies
occurring on its territory. Hence, the affected State has the
primary role in the initiation, organization, coordination, and
implementation of humanitarian assistance within its territo-
ry. 76
72. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions
as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30–32 (1913).
73. Id. at 31.
74. P J FITZGERALD, SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 217 (12th ed. 2012).
75. G.A. Res. 46/182, supra note 8, ¶ 4.
76. Id.
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Equally, the GHD, an informal grouping of donor states, has
reaffirmed the “primary responsibility” of states to provide
humanitarian relief to victims of disaster that are within their
borders. 77 The 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development
has also recognized that states bear the “primary responsibil-
ity” of creating national and international conditions (for in-
stance, those of engaging external donors and transnational
agencies) that promote the realization of the right to develop-
ment.78
While states bear this primary responsibility, where a state
fails to fulfil its primary obligation to provide humanitarian
relief, the international community assumes secondary or sub-
sidiary responsibility to provide assistance, emanating from
their right to provide humanitarian relief. Being entitled to a
right implies that its claimant incurs certain duties, in addition
to other people bearing duties in relation to the claimant. R.
Bhalla instructively opines that:
The relation of right and duty is also seen from another angle
which states that in order to have a right a person must ac-
cept a duty as well, that is, right and duty… [may] exist in
the same person at the same time...For example, if a person
has a right to life, he must accept the duty to respect the life
of others. Here right and duty exist in the same person rather
than in two different persons.79
As discussed, the secondary responsibility of other states and
NGOs to provide humanitarian assistance where a domestic
state is unable or unwilling to do so arises from the right of
humanitarian agencies to provide relief. If the domestic state is
not fulfilling its primary responsibility, and is particularly ob-
structing the provision of humanitarian assistance by second-
ary actors, sanctions can even be imposed upon the state to fa-
cilitate the delivery of relief. For instance, the U.N. Security
Council has previously authorized states “to use all necessary
77. Int’l Meeting on Good Humanitarian Donorship, Principles and Good
Practice of Humanitarian Donorship, para. 5 (June 17, 2003),
http://www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/gns/principles-good-practice-
ghd/overview.aspx (last visited May 19, 2014) [hereinafter Good Humanitari-
an Donorship].
78. Right to Development, supra note 19, art. 3. The parenthetical exam-
ples give our own illustration of the primary responsibility of states.
79. R.S. BHALLA, CONCEPTS OF JURISPRUDENCE 80 (1990).
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means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for
humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.”80
The flow of responsibilities from the subject state to the in-
ternational community of states, and nongovernmental agen-
cies, has been affirmed by both states and commentators. For
example, although the GHD consortium of donor states, has
“reaffirm[ed] the primary responsibility of states for the victims
of humanitarian emergencies within their own borders”, it still
endeavours “to ensure flexible and timely funding, on the basis
of the collective obligation of striving to meet humanitarian
needs.”81 The 2008 European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid
observes that “[h]umanitarian action is a collective responsibil-
ity at an international level, involving many different organisa-
tions, governments, local communities and individuals.”82
Therefore, while states bear the primary responsibility for the
provision of humanitarian assistance within their borders, oth-
er states within the international community, and non-state
actors such as NGOs, may have, or can claim, a secondary or
subsidiary responsibility.
III. A HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO THE PROVISION OF
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE: CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
Although a human rights approach is not a binding principle
of international law, it is based on the progressive philosophy
of effectively “protecting the worst-off, the poorest and the most
vulnerable.”83 In addition, a human-rights approach emphasiz-
es the “interrelation and interdependence of human rights.”84
With regard to a state’s obligations, a human rights approach
implies that states have a duty “to respect, protect and fulfil
the rights of their citizens and of the people living in their ter-
ritory.”85 This approach, therefore, requires human rights
80. S.C. Res. 794, supra note 13, at 10.
81. Good Humanitarian Donorship, supra note 77, para. 5.
82. European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid para. 66, 2008 O.J. (C 25) 1
[hereinafter ECHA].
83. Sengupta, supra note 25, at 97.
84. Brigitte I. Hamm, A Human Rights Approach to Development, 23 HUM.
RTS. Q. 1005, 1006 (2001).
85. BROOKINGS-BERN PROJECT ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND NATURAL DISASTERS: OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES AND FIELD MANUAL ON
HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION IN SITUATIONS OF NATURAL DISASTER 8 (2008),
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/49a2b8f72.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2015).
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standards in various developmental activities of the state.
However, states may have insufficient resources to enable
them to effectively protect and fulfil the rights of those within
their borders, especially during disasters. In such circumstanc-
es, states are under an obligation to both appeal for and accept
assistance from other states and nongovernmental organiza-
tions.
Under the framework of a human-rights approach, states and
nongovernmental organizations undertaking humanitarian as-
sistance are required to fulfil certain obligations. For instance,
a human rights approach requires special focus on the margin-
alized or excluded groups, ensuring they are not discriminated
against, and facilitating the establishment of mechanisms for
their participation and empowerment.86 Some commentators
argue that the implementation of the right to development,
which has a nexus to the provision of humanitarian assistance,
should be:
[C]arried out according to the human rights standards, that
is, with transparency, accountability and in a non-
discriminatory and participatory manner and with equity and
justice. In practice, this means that the schemes should be
formulated and implemented at the grass-roots level with the
beneficiaries participating in the decision-making and imple-
mentation, as well as sharing equitably in the benefits. In
short, this implies planning that empowers the beneficiar-
ies.87
As previously noted, a human-rights approach is concerned
with the protection of the vulnerable. Such an approach seeks
to ensure that marginalized populations are free from discrim-
ination as empowered, active participants in national affairs.88
Vulnerable and marginalized groups should be empowered to
participate in economic and social programs of the state. For
instance, there should be public participation forums within
the state governance structures that specifically facilitate the
marginalized and vulnerable groups to articulate their econom-
ic and social concerns and interests.
A human rights approach to the provision of humanitarian
assistance requires legal, policy, and institutional mechanisms
86. Hamm, supra note 84, at 1011.
87. Sengupta, supra note 25, at 97.
88. See Hamm, supra note 84, at 1011.
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to ensure local participation and grass-roots capacity build-
ing.89 This article argues that the current emphasis and en-
dorsement of local participation in humanitarian relief has
been precipitated by a shift towards a human rights approach
by states and non-state actors. The next section examines the
relevant legal and policy instruments, and self-regulatory
standards of NGOs, which indicate that an obligation to ensure
local participation in humanitarian assistance activities is
emerging. 90
A. Local Participation as an Emerging Obligation in the Hu-
man Rights-Approach to Humanitarian Assistance
As discussed above, a central requirement in a human-rights
approach to humanitarian assistance is the participation, pro-
tection, and non-discrimination of the vulnerable.91 The partic-
ipation of beneficiaries has become one of the core issues in
contemporary humanitarian-relief standards.92 This trend is
evidenced by several international instruments. The 1991 Dec-
laration on Strengthening of the Co-ordination of Humanitari-
an Emergency Assistance of the United Nations states that
country level co-ordination should include the use of locally
available relief capacities.93 The 2005 Hyogo Declaration,
adopted by states under the auspices of the United Nations Of-
fice for Disaster Risk Reduction, affirms the necessity of com-
munity level capacities as a mechanism of diminishing the dis-
aster risk.94 The 2008 European Consensus on Humanitarian
Aid provides that humanitarian activities by the EU are meant
to support “local responses to humanitarian crises through a
89. A human rights approach particularly emphasizes participation. Dor-
othea Hilhorst, Being Good at Doing Good? Quality and Accountability of
Humanitarian NGOs, 26 DISASTERS 193, 199 (2002). Hilhorst in particular
notes that a human-rights-based approach commendably breaks away from
the ‘earlier patronizing paradigms.’ Id.
90. For more complete discussion, see ALI, S., GOVERNING DISASTERS:
ENGAGING LOCAL POPULATIONS IN HUMANITARIAN RELIEF, HUMANITARIAN
POLICY PAPER SERIES (2015).
91. See Sengupta, supra note 25, at 97.
92. BÉATRICE POULIGNY, SUPPORTING LOCAL OWNERSHIP IN HUMANITARIAN
ACTION 6 (2009),
http://www.disastergovernance.net/fileadmin/gppi/GPPiPPR_local_ownership
_2009.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2015).
93. G.A. Res. 46/182, supra note 8, ¶ 39.
94. Hyogo Declaration, supra note 12, ¶ 4.
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partnership approach with the affected communities.”95 The
Good Humanitarian Donorship consortium of states emphasiz-
es the need to involve the “beneficiaries in the design, imple-
mentation, monitoring and evaluation” of relief activities.96 The
2012 Food Assistance Convention stipulates one of the govern-
ing principles in the provision of food assistance as being the
involvement of the “beneficiaries in the assessment of their
needs and in the design, implementation, monitoring and eval-
uation” of the relief activities.97
The 2008 Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Com-
plex Emergencies by the United Nations and the Inter-Agency
Standing Committee (“IASC”) provides further guidance for
beneficiaries and relief providers. This instrument states that
beneficiaries of relief and local personnel should be involved, to
the extent possible, “in the design, management and imple-
mentation of assistance, including in civil-military co-
ordination.”98 The Sphere Humanitarian Charter, drafted by a
consortium of NGOs, expressly states that its principles and
standards are based on a “rights-based and people-centred ap-
proach” to the provision of humanitarian relief.99 The Sphere
Charter specifically affirms that its standards and principles
are based on the need of involving the beneficiaries of assis-
tance and local authorities.100 Max O’Donnell et al. argue that
the Sphere Charter may, in the future, contribute to the for-
mation of international customary law with respect to “the
rights of beneficiaries to a specific quality of response” by the
states and nongovernmental organizations in situations of hu-
manitarian disaster.101 Such practice by state and non-state
actors exemplifies the adoption of a human-rights approach to
humanitarian assistance. Indeed, legal instruments adopted by
95. ECHA, supra note 82, para. 4.
96. Good Humanitarian Donorship, supra note 77, para. 7.
97. Food Assistance Convention, supra note 4, art. 2(c)(ii).
98. UNITED NATIONS & THE INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMMITTEE, CIVIL-
MILITARY GUIDELINES AND REFERENCE FOR COMPLEX EMERGENCIES 19 (2008),
https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/ENGLISH%20VERSION%20Gu
idelines%20for%20Complex%20Emergencies.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2015)
[hereinafter CIVIL-MILITARYGUIDELINES].
99. SPHERE PROJECT, supra note 49, at 6.
100. Id.
101. Max R. O’Donnell, Dimitri Bacos & Michael L. Bennish, Nutritional
Response to the 1998 Bangladesh Flood Disaster: Sphere Minimum Stand-
ards in Disaster Response, 26 DISASTERS 229, 238–39 (2002).
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states and self-regulatory mechanisms of NGOs such as the
Sphere Charter represent a progressive codification of an obli-
gation to ensure local participation in relief activities.
Incorporation of local participation in relief activities by aid
agencies has become an emerging obligation in the human-
rights approach to humanitarian assistance. The Code of Good
Practice of the People in Aid, a network of NGOs, requires that
policies give consideration to local legal and cultural issues
through the notion of thinking globally, but acting locally.102
The HAP Project aims at stimulating accountability of humani-
tarian agencies to beneficiaries through standards on quality
and accountability, and includes certification mechanisms.103 In
addition, HAP provides a forum through which relief benefi-
ciaries can articulate their grievances against humanitarian
agencies.104 The ECB Project formulates tools and mechanisms
for ensuring the participation of local people during the project
assessment, design, implementation and monitoring.105 The
2001 “Responsibility to Protect” Report of the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty cautioned
that:
[A] reconstruction and rehabilitation programme which does
not take sufficient account of local priorities and excludes lo-
cal personnel could create an unhealthy dependency on the
intervening authority, stultify the regrowth of local institu-
tions and the economy, and infinitely delay the population’s
desire or ability to resume responsibility for its own govern-
ment.106
Relief agencies have an emerging obligation to involve the local
beneficiaries in the design, implementation, monitoring and
evaluation of humanitarian projects. The next section examines
102. PEOPLE IN AID, CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE IN THE MANAGEMENT AND
SUPPORT OF AID PERSONNEL 10–11 (2003),
http://www.peopleinaid.org/pool/files/code/code-en.pdf (last visited Sept. 10,
2015).
103. About Us, HUMANITARIAN ACCOUNTABILITY PARTNERSHIP,
http://www.hapinternational.org/who-we-are/about-us.aspx (last visited Apr.
25, 2014).
104. Tong, supra note 57, at 176.
105. EMERGENCY CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT, IMPACT MEASUREMENT AND
ACCOUNTABILITY INEMERGENCIES: THEGOOD ENOUGHGUIDE 34–35 (2007).
106. INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT ¶ 5.27 (2001).
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some of the problems and opportunities in the institutionaliza-
tion of local participation in humanitarian-relief activities.
B. Themes, Problems, and Opportunities in the Institutionaliza-
tion of Local Participation in Humanitarian Relief Activities
It is apparent that the issue of local participation is central in
the provision of humanitarian relief, and is even evolving to an
obligation. This section highlights the themes that have
emerged in the local participation discourse, the problems that
impact humanitarian agencies in their quest to incorporate lo-
cal participation, and the opportunities that humanitarian ac-
tors can exploit.
1. Determining Legitimate Local Participants
First, determining the people who qualify as “local” may be
problematic. At times the phrase “local” differentiates between
national and international actors. Yet at other times, a person
originating from another region in the same state may be re-
garded as an outsider, and therefore not be deemed a local par-
ticipant.107 As such, even a national of the state may in certain
contexts not be deemed a local with regard to humanitarian
activities. The legitimacy of local participants is inevitably dis-
puted in efforts to ensure local ownership of humanitarian pro-
jects.108
The concept of “insiders” and “outsiders,” despite having
some element of subjectivity, helps distinguish those who quali-
fy as locals, and, therefore, must be involved as participants in
relief efforts.109 Under this criterion, an insider is a person or
community that is vulnerable or affected by the disaster, and
therefore must be involved as a local participant in relief ef-
forts. Outsiders are individuals and agencies who involve
themselves as parties in a conflict or as providers of humani-
tarian assistance.110 The concept of insider and outsider is ac-
commodative in determining local participants as it has no ge-
107. Pouligny, supra note 92, at 6–7.
108. HANNAH REICH, “LOCAL OWNERSHIP” IN CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION
PROJECTS: PARTNERSHIP, PARTICIPATION OR PATRONAGE? 7 (2006),
http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/2544/pdf/boc27e.pdf (last visited
Sept. 10, 2015).
109. Pouligny, supra note 92, at 6–7.
110. Id.
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ographical limitations. Depending on the magnitude of disas-
ter, local participants can be populations within neighboring
states, or inhabitants of a small village or settlement.
The concept of insider and outsider may be incorporated in
resolutions adopted by states and in the self-regulatory mecha-
nisms of NGOs to provide a criterion for determining legitimate
local participants in relief efforts. In addition, humanitarian
actors should recognize that local participants may include di-
verse groups and entities with varying strengths and limita-
tions.111 For instance, local relief participants may include
women advocacy groups, religious institutions, nongovernmen-
tal organizations, local government officials, and community
leaders.112 It is imperative for external humanitarian agencies
to include the various categories of local actors as much as it is
feasible.
2. Standards and Depth of Local Participation
Despite the now common narrative of local participation in
humanitarian relief projects, local participation is still an “infi-
nitely malleable concept” that amounts to anything that in-
volves local people.113 Equally, NGOs and external humanitari-
an agencies have, at times, declined to recognize local resources
and avoided qualitative local participation. During the 2004
Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunamis that affected Asian
states such as Sri Lanka, Indonesia, India, and Thailand, it has
been observed that international agencies at times ignored lo-
cal resources and structures, despite their subscription to
standards that require their engagement with local actors.114
111. LARRY MINEAR, THE HUMANITARIAN ENTERPRISE: DILEMMAS AND
DISCOVERIES 57 (2002).
112. Id. To ensure diversity in the representation of the local community,
humanitarian agencies should strive to engage, or consult, the widest catego-
rization of groups within the beneficiary population that may be practically
possible. Therefore, to achieve diversity in the local community participants,
or those to be consulted, the population may be categorized on the basis of
gender, age, occupation, level of education or professional training, religion,
household income, etc. With regard to community leaders, besides involving
local administrators in the formal state governance system, the community
can be requested to nominate their representatives.
113. Andrea Cornwall, Unpacking ‘Participation’: Models, Meanings and
Practices, 43 CMTY. DEV. J. 269, 269 (2008).
114. JOHN COSGRAVE, TSUNAMI EVALUATION COALITION, JOINT EVALUATION
OF THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE INDIAN OCEAN TSUNAMI: SYNTHESIS
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International agencies are also accused of having avoided ac-
countability to the beneficiaries of relief, and of failing to com-
municate effectively with beneficiary communities.115 Even the
international media, critical in shaping the views of the public
on the contributions of various actors, often publicizes the role
of external participants while ignoring that of the locals, in-
cluding the host government and community civil societies.116
Therefore, the media has, at times, reinforced the notion of the
humanitarian relief as a responsibility of external agencies.117
In some circumstances, even where local agencies are incorpo-
rated in the relief project, the arrangement is more of “patron-
age than partnership,” with the local organization merely fol-
lowing instructions.118 However, neglecting and avoiding the
involvement of the local community can contribute to burden-
shifting of disaster mitigation responsibilities to external hu-
manitarian actors.
One of the factors that legitimizes the qualitative participa-
tion of locals is their immediate and timely role during the oc-
currence of disasters. On that basis, the EU recognizes that the
protection of lives is enhanced through the strengthening of the
local capacity, as locals are well-positioned to respond immedi-
ately when the disaster occurs.119 For example, during the 2004
Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunamis in some parts of South
East Asia, local people provided the early emergency services,
and undertook almost all action that resulted in the saving of
lives at that time.120 As an illustration of the immediate and
significant rescue role of the locals after the earthquake and
tsunamis, the events at Banda Aceh, Indonesia, are described
by Jon Bennett et al. as follows:
REPORT 4 (2007). See also, John Telford & John Cosgrave, The Int’l Humani-
tarian System and the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunamis, 31
DISASTERS 1, 10 (2007); M.W. Amarasiri de Silva, Ethnicity, Politics and Ine-
quality: Post-Tsunami Humanitarian Aid Delivery in Ampara District, Sri
Lanka, 33 DISASTERS 253, 258 (2009).
115. COSGRAVE, supra note 114, at 4.
116. MINEAR, supra note 111, at 65.
117. Id.
118. HUMANITARIAN & WAR PROJECT, PATRONAGE OR PARTNERSHIP: LOCAL
CAPACITY BUILDING INHUMANITARIAN CRISES 1 (Ian Smillie ed., 2001).
119. ECHA, supra note 82, para. 74.
120. COSGRAVE, supra note 114, at 4.
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[I]n the first week, some temporary shelters were already be-
ing run by students/volunteers, heads of mosques and local
NGOs prior to the arrival of any international organisations.
These were the first informants. Then came the government
and military, then international NGOs, then international
military, and finally the establishment of UN offices and UN
common services.121
The affected population is often the best source of first-hand
information that is required by external humanitarian relief
providers, and therefore they should not be viewed as mere vic-
tims and inactive beneficiaries of aid.122 Local knowledge pro-
vides external humanitarian agencies with information that
they can rapidly examine to determine the initial needs and
opportunities for the mitigation of disaster.123
Often, there are insufficient resources to address the effects
of disaster and save lives. Local resources are essential in sup-
plementing the resources of the external agencies in order to
have more effective disaster mitigation. Although international
skills and resources are critical in mitigating a humanitarian
crisis, they are insufficient on their own.124 Collaboration and
burden-sharing, through the use of both local and external
knowledge and resources, is therefore essential. Local commu-
nities can “be a source of strength, contributing innovative ide-
as and local knowledge which, when mobilised and used appro-
priately, can lead to solutions that can make a fundamental
contribution to mitigating the negative impacts of natural dis-
asters.”125 Therefore, for greater efficiency and success in the
delivery of humanitarian assistance, local resources and
knowledge should not be despised or ignored, but should be
tapped to the highest extent possible.
Indeed, external humanitarian actors can benefit from local
coping mechanisms and knowledge on disaster mitigation, de-
121. JON BENNETT ET AL., TSUNAMI EVALUATION COALITION, COORDINATION OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN TSUNAMI-AFFECTED COUNTRIES
34 (2006), http://www.alnap.org/resource/3530 (last visited Sept. 10, 2015)
[hereinafter TSUNAMI EVALUATION COALITION].
122. Pouligny, supra note 92, at 6–7.
123. Phong Tran et al., GIS and Local Knowledge in Disaster Mgmt.: A Case
Study of Flood Risk Mapping in Viet Nam, 33 DISASTERS 152, 154 (2009).
124. Wolfgang Fengler & Homi Kharas, Delivering Aid Differently: Lessons
from the Field, 49 ECON. PREMISE 1, 7 (2011).
125. Tran, supra note 123, at 152.
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veloped over decades of experience. Communities, especially in
developing countries where governments often have minimal
resources, have relied on their coping mechanisms and
knowledge to respond to disaster and mitigate its effects.126
With regard to flood risk mapping in Viet Nam, it has been
pointed out that the integration of local knowledge into the dis-
aster-management scheme provides relief agencies with great-
er insights into the various aspects of vulnerability to disas-
ter.127 Therefore, when external NGOs bring in new technology
and knowledge, local practices and traditions should not be
displaced if they have been beneficial to the community.128 Ef-
forts should be made to balance the introduction of external
technology and innovations with support for local practices and
knowledge.129
In order to address the challenge of local participation, there
are helpful and qualitative guidelines and standards that are
emerging from treaties, resolutions of states, and self-
regulatory instruments of the non-governmental organiza-
tions.130 The guidelines and standards require that local partic-
ipants be involved, at the minimum, “in the design, implemen-
tation, monitoring and evaluation” of the humanitarian relief
activities.131 One such guideline is the Sphere Humanitarian
Charter.
A range of basic activities are postulated under the Sphere
Humanitarian Charter which are deemed prerequisites to peo-
ple-centered relief efforts that involve qualitative local partici-
126. Mikio Ishiwatari, Government Roles in Community-Based Disaster
Risk Reduction, in COMMUNITY-BASEDDISASTER RISK REDUCTION 19, 21 (Rajib
Shaw ed., 2012). Local people have extensive knowledge about their envi-
ronment, which they have used over the years in order to cope with disasters.
Dorothea Hilhorst, Responding to Disasters: Diversity of Bureaucrats, Tech-
nocrats and Local People, 21 INT’L J. MASS EMERGENCIES & DISASTERS 37, 47
(2003).
127. Tran, supra note 123, at 168.
128. David Alexander, The Study of Natural Disasters, 1977-1997: Some
Reflections on a Changing Field of Knowledge, 2 DISASTERS 284, 299 (1997).
129. Id. See also, Tran, supra note 123, at 153.
130. See Food Assistance Convention, supra note 4; see also Good Humani-
tarian Donorship, supra note 77; CIVIL-MILITARY GUIDELINES, supra note 98;
EMERGENCY CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT, supra note 105.
131. Food Assistance Convention, supra note 4, at 4. See also, Good Human-
itarian Donorship, supra note 77, para. 7; CIVIL-MILITARY GUIDELINES supra
note 98, at 19; EMERGENCY CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT, supra note 105, at
34–35.
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pation.132 First, as a way of stimulating local capacity, the
Sphere Charter obligates external humanitarian actors to iden-
tify and utilize local social networks and community organiza-
tions, including supporting self-help and community-based ef-
forts.133 Second, humanitarian agencies should ensure that lo-
cal communities have access to appropriate and safe venues,
where they can hold meetings and information sharing ses-
sions.134 Third, there should be sufficient and balanced repre-
sentation of the beneficiaries in their meetings with humani-
tarian agencies.135 Fourth, relief beneficiaries should be provid-
ed with sufficient information on the humanitarian agency, for
instance, on the organization’s projects and the entitlements of
the population, in a language and format that they can com-
prehend.136 Fifth, transparent and effective feedback mecha-
nisms, which empower the beneficiary community to influence
the implementation of the relief activities, should be estab-
lished and made available to the beneficiaries.137
Sixth, humanitarian organizations have an obligation to es-
tablish effective complaints systems that enable beneficiaries
to raise grievances in an easy and safe manner, in addition to
ensuring that replies and required actions are carried out in a
transparent and timely way.138 Seventh, the Sphere Charter
requires that local resources, such as labor and environmental-
ly sustainable materials, be utilized by humanitarian agencies
as a mechanism of promoting proper recovery and enhancing
the local economy.139 Eighth, the Sphere Charter requires that
progressive local religious, cultural and traditional norms be
considered, accommodated and upheld in programs by relief
agencies.140 Ninth, as the humanitarian project progresses, re-
lief agencies are required to progressively increase the level of
participation by the local people, by enhancing the beneficiary
people’s ownership of programs and decision-making power.141
132. SPHERE PROJECT, supra note 49, at 55.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 56.
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As the mechanisms of the Sphere Charter indicate, emerging
guidelines ensure uniform and objective qualitative standards
for participation by beneficiaries in various stages of the relief
project carried out by external actors.
Commitment in the implementation of the established stand-
ards is still required. Theory and concepts must be transformed
into actual practice. However, there is already the acknowl-
edgement of the need for local participation, and objective regu-
lations are being formulated, indicating that there is progress
towards quality local participation. The existence of standards,
especially the self–regulation mechanisms of the NGOs, indi-
cates some level of commitment, which may progress to effec-
tive implementation.
3. Tension between Local Cultural Practices and Human
Rights Norms
As previously observed, most humanitarian and human
rights NGOs with adequate resources are based in western
countries but often send their staff to the field in other
states.142 The staff and representatives of the NGOs at times
“experience ethical conflicts where they must decide between
promoting their versions of human rights norms and respecting
… cultural norms” of the local people.143 Daniel Bell and Joseph
Carens propose three approaches in addressing this tension
between human rights norms and local cultural practices, espe-
cially in relation to international nongovernmental organiza-
tions.144 These approaches include condoning reasonable differ-
ing cultural ideologies, “revising the principles and practices” of
the organization where necessary, and confronting unreasona-
ble cultural practices, which may have the benefit of improving
the livelihoods of marginalized and vulnerable members of the
society.145
The Sphere Charter employs the approaches proposed by Bell
and Carens by requiring that progressive local cultural, tradi-
tional and religious practices be accommodated and upheld in
humanitarian projects.146 The Charter even requires that in-
142. Bell & Carens, supra note 43, at 303.
143. Id. at 304.
144. Id. at 304–07.
145. Id.
146. SPHERE PROJECT, supra note 49, at 55.
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formation on the humanitarian agency be provided to the bene-
ficiary communities in a language and format that they can
comprehend.147 In addition, Bell and Carens’ suggestions are
affirmed by the 2008 Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference
for Complex Emergencies, which recognize that “[r]espect and
sensitivities must be maintained for the culture, structures and
customs of the communities and countries where humanitarian
activities are carried out.”148
4. Capacity Building and Sustainability of Recovery
Disaster mitigation and recovery projects are not sustainable
in the long term if they are wholly conceptualized by external
actors and implemented locally without the participation and
capacity empowerment of the beneficiaries.149 If external pro-
viders of humanitarian assistance solely provide solutions, ra-
ther than assisting beneficiaries in formulating and imple-
menting remedies, the capacities of local communities may be
undermined and diminished.150
States and self-regulation instruments of NGOs have recog-
nized and endorsed the need to develop the capacity of the local
community as a mechanism of ensuring sustainable, long-term
recovery. For instance, the 2005 Hyogo Declaration acknowl-
edged that it is necessary to strengthen the capacities of com-
munities to address risks of disasters as a way of reducing
their vulnerabilities.151 The 2008 European Consensus on Hu-
manitarian Aid equally emphasized local capacity, stating that
part of the EU humanitarian aid practices include the building
of local capacities to mitigate and pre-empt the impact of disas-
ters and enhance the response capabilities.152 In the case of the
GHD consortium of states, strengthening the capacities of sub-
ject communities to address and resolve humanitarian trage-
dies remains the principal objective.153 Likewise, the Sphere
Charter obligates humanitarian agencies to utilize local re-
147. Id.
148. CIVIL-MILITARYGUIDELINES, supra note 98, at 19.
149. REICH, supra note 108, at 6.
150. Anne H. Toomey, Empowerment and Disempowerment in Community
Development Practice: Eight Roles Practitioners Play, 46 COMMUNITY DEV. J.
181, 185 (2011).
151. Hyogo Declaration, supra note 12, ¶ 4.
152. ECHA, supra note 82, para. 9.
153. Good Humanitarian Donorship, supra note 77, para. 8.
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sources such as labor and materials as a mechanism of enhanc-
ing the recovery of the community and promoting the growth of
the local economy.154 These obligations must be implemented
by states and humanitarian agencies as a way of progressively
reducing the vulnerability of communities, and in order to ren-
der recovery efforts long-term and sustainable. Ultimately, the
solution to the disaster risk of vulnerable communities is local
self-sufficiency, which can be achieved through the transfer of
technology and expertise by external relief agencies to the local
community.155
5. Coordination and Collaboration Problems
The provision of humanitarian relief often involves various
participants from both external agencies and local communi-
ties. As such, there may be both dilemmas and mishaps of co-
ordination and collaboration. Clear partnership strategies and
rules of engagement, which encourage effective burden-sharing
while reducing tension and duplicity, are necessary. The pri-
mary role of the host government in providing general coordi-
nation, leadership, and guidance is recognized. For instance,
the 2008 European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid states
that while its members operate in partnership with the affect-
ed communities, “[n]ational authorities in countries faced with
crisis retain the primary responsibility for protecting popula-
tions confronting disaster.”156 This indicates that the EU rec-
ognizes the primary role of state authorities in providing gen-
eral leadership in matters of coordination and collaboration.
Similarly, the Sphere Charter also allocates the primary duty
of coordination of humanitarian aid on the government of the
host state.157
However, there are circumstances where the government of
the host state is incapable of providing proper coordination and
guidance, or is otherwise unwilling. With regard to incapacity,
it has been observed that in the case of Sri Lanka after the
earthquake and tsunamis of December 2004, the local govern-
ment was unable to effectively coordinate and register the ac-
154. SPHERE PROJECT, supra note 49, at 55.
155. David Alexander, Globalization of Disaster: Trends, Problems and Di-
lemmas, 59 J. INT’L AFFAIRS 1, 12 (2006).
156. ECHA, supra note 82, para. 4.
157. SPHERE PROJECT, supra note 49, at 60.
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tions of the many humanitarian agencies that were active on
the ground.158 However, the failure of the international relief
agencies to mitigate Sri Lanka’s incapacity was arguably in-
consistent with the principles articulated in the Sphere Char-
ter. As recognized in the Sphere Charter, where the host state
is unwilling or unable to provide effective coordination services,
appropriate options should be devised.159 To address the lacu-
na, the Sphere Charter proposes that humanitarian agencies
can rely on a lead agency, which they can collectively nominate,
to operate as the primary provider of coordination services, or
even seek guidance from more resourcefully endowed and ac-
ceptable intergovernmental agencies such as those of the
U.N.160 In the case of Sri Lanka after the 2004 tsunamis, it has
been argued that international agencies should have utilized
their immense capacity to address and mitigate the absence of
the Government’s coordination services at the initial stage, ra-
ther than just “regretting” such failures and challenges.161
Therefore, since co-ordination and collaboration problems can
seriously impede the efficiency and success of the delivery of
humanitarian assistance by multiple participants, where the
host state is unwilling or unable to provide coordination ser-
vices, relief agencies can nominate a lead organization to ad-
dress the leadership lacuna.
6. Accountability to Beneficiaries
At times, the organizational failures of international humani-
tarian agencies can impair relief efforts. During the humani-
tarian response to the 2004 earthquake and tsunamis in parts
of South East Asia, it was observed that accountability through
joint agency communication, regular updates on recovery activ-
ities and a complaints mechanism were lacking.162 Because
consultation and communication between the humanitarian
agencies and the beneficiary communities was uncoordinated
and erratic, there was a lot of misinformation and frustration
within the beneficiary communities.163 At other times, the ob-
jectives of the humanitarian agencies are the determinants of
158. TSUNAMI EVALUATION COALITION, supra note 121, at 42.
159. SPHERE PROJECT, supra note 49, at 60.
160. Id.
161. TSUNAMI EVALUATION COALITION, supra note 121, at 42.
162. Id. at 11–12.
163. Id. at 12.
2015] Global Regulation of Humanitarian Relief 823
the decisions and activities undertaken by the organizations,
rather than the needs of the beneficiaries on the basis of objec-
tive assessments.164
Frustration through a perceived lack of accountability, or
failure to understand and meet local expectations, can even
have dangerous consequences for the staff of humanitarian
agencies. Research on local perceptions of humanitarian action
through case studies in different countries between 2006 and
2007 concluded that there was increased security risk for hu-
manitarian agencies’ staff in Nepal and Pakistan due to their
failure to meet local expectations or respond appropriately to
local political dynamics.165 Consequently, there were incidences
of violence and threats against humanitarian agencies’ staff
and the organizations’ premises, especially in Pakistan.166
Proper accountability requires that agencies communicate
their activities, explain such actions, and accept criticism.167 By
so doing, relief agencies are able to receive important feedback
concerning the efficacy or shortcomings of their activities, poli-
cies, and procedures. In addition, feedback from the beneficiary
communities often includes important information for the mon-
itoring and evaluation mechanisms of relief agencies. Donors of
relief agencies are likely to be more interested in funding or-
ganizations that take into consideration the concerns and
needs of the beneficiaries, and are accountable to the aid recip-
ients in the design, implementation, and evaluation of humani-
tarian assistance projects. The benefit of downward accounta-
bility to the beneficiaries is that if effectively implemented, it
largely involves accountability to the agency donors also.168
Therefore, downward accountability is beneficial to the relief
agencies both in the context of the efficacy of their projects to
the beneficiaries, and with regard to their relationship with
donors. Due to the importance of such accountability in the
164. Helen Young, Public Nutrition in Emergencies: An Overview of De-
bates, Dilemmas and Decision-Making, 23 DISASTERS 277, 281 (1999). Young
draws this conclusion from a 1999 case study by Patricia Diskett and Rita
Bhatia in Bangladesh.
165. ANTONIO DONINI ET AL., HUMANITARIAN AGENDA 2015: FINAL REPORT:
THE STATE OF THEHUMANITARIAN ENTERPRISE 23 (2015).
166. Id.
167. COSGRAVE, supra note 114, at 23.
168. Id.
824 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:3
provision of humanitarian assistance, the Sphere Charter has
elaborate provisions on the issue.
As a mechanism of improving accountability, the Sphere
Charter obligates humanitarian agencies to increase the deci-
sion making power of the beneficiaries, including the owner-
ship of the projects.169 The Humanitarian Charter also requires
humanitarian agencies to establish efficient and transparent
feedback mechanisms through which the beneficiaries can pro-
vide their responses and influence relief activities.170 In addi-
tion, the Charter requires the establishment of a complaints
system that is safe and easily accessible to the beneficiaries.171
Finally, responses and action by humanitarian agencies should
be transparent and timely.172
Commentators have also proposed other local participation
monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. For instance, Dor-
othea Hilhorst postulates various modes of monitoring and
evaluating accountability and quality of NGOs involved in hu-
manitarian aid, which can be used in the assessment of wheth-
er the extent of local participation by various agencies is ade-
quate and proper.173 The modes of monitoring and evaluation
include social audits, gauging activities on a code of conduct,
accreditation to quality evaluation agencies and peer re-
views.174 The issue of accountability to the beneficiaries of aid
is a significant matter in the context of the establishment of
qualitative local participation mechanisms by humanitarian
agencies. There is the danger that humanitarian organizations
can be motivated, primarily, by their own objectives, without
qualitative consideration of the unique needs of the beneficiar-
ies. Such an approach can result in the failure of relief agencies
to address local expectations, or merely act in accordance with
local political and social norms, which can have multiple nega-
tive implications that may include increased security risks to
their staff. It is, therefore, in the interest of humanitarian
agencies that they enhance downward accountability. Besides
contributing to greater acceptability of the humanitarian agen-
cies activities by the locals, in addition to enhancing the quality
169. SPHERE PROJECT, supra note 49, at 56.
170. Id. at 55.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Hilhorst, supra note 89, at 206–09.
174. Id.
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of their assistance, the resource bases of such organizations are
also likely to increase due to greater approval of their projects
by the donors.
CONCLUSION
This article is premised on the view that the global govern-
ance of humanitarian relief, by both the legal and policy in-
struments of states and the self-regulatory mechanisms of
NGOs, has elements of a human-rights approach to humanitar-
ian assistance. The existence of the right to provide humanitar-
ian assistance within the international legal regime is the basis
of the responsibilities of other states and humanitarian agen-
cies in the provision of relief. If the domestic state, which bears
the primary duty, is unable or unwilling to provide humanitar-
ian assistance to its suffering population, then other states and
nongovernmental organizations have a subsidiary responsibil-
ity to act. The fact that the self-regulation mechanisms of non-
state actors have an influence on the development of interna-
tional legal and policy regime on humanitarian assistance, es-
pecially due to the impetus created by globalization, has been
demonstrated.
Further, the human rights-based approach to the provision of
humanitarian assistance has made the issue of participation by
the beneficiaries a core concern of the legal and policy instru-
ments of states and the self-regulatory mechanisms of NGOs.
On that basis, the human rights-based approach to humanitar-
ian assistance is contributing to the emergence of an obligation
to ensure local participation in relief projects.
Problems and opportunities that have characterized the ongo-
ing institutionalization of local participation in humanitarian-
relief activities persist. These include the determination of the
legitimate local participants, the quality of participation, the
impact of tensions between local cultural practices, and human
rights norms, coordination challenges and accountability to the
beneficiary community. Despite the identified challenges, qual-
itative local participation has the effect of increasing the legit-
imacy and acceptability of the activities of humanitarian NGOs
amongst the beneficiary population, in addition to enhancing
the effectiveness of aid programs. Local participation increases
the likelihood of approval and positive rating of the projects of
relief organizations by donors, thus improving their resource
base. It is on that basis that qualitative local participation is
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increasingly becoming a core obligation in the human rights-
based approach to humanitarian assistance by relief agencies.
